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Abstract. In every country, wages are determined by Nash rule or governments 
determine wages. According to Nash equilibrium, policy of determination wages is 
respect to exchange rate and there is a game between NWC and MAS. In this paper, 
we survey a game theory method to survey policy of determination wages and 
exchange rate to stability economics. When exchange rate increases, import good's 
price rise and we have cost push inflation, therefore wages are increased and then 
we have unemployment. Then wages are determined respect to exchange rate 
changes. But in real world, some conditions affected on Nash equilibrium and wages 
are determined as non Nash method and government equals between benefits of 
workers and principals. In this paper, we survey wage making in Iran and reveal that 
in some courtiers such as Iran, government determines wages and create equilibrium 
in labor market. 
Keywords. Wage, Exchange rate, Nash Equilibrium, Inflation, Game theory 
method. 
JEL. Q30, Q31, Q32. 
 
1. Introduction 
xchange rate and wage are economic variables. In some countries, 
wages are determined as negotiation between workers and principals. 
In this paper, NWC is worker's syndical or government which wants 
to equal between workers and principals. If wages are determined wrong, it 
is caused to inflation. In some countries, exchange rate is determined by 
government and it's value is affected on export, import, economic growth 
and employment. In other hand, exchange rate can affect on wages. 
Depreciation of inter money respect to foreign money is caused to expensive 
import of inputs, then we have cost push inflation and wages are increased. 
 In this paper, we survey game between NWC or wage makers and MAS 
or exchange rate determinations and show government is a wage maker and 
Nash equilibrium is not applied in Iran. As follow, model in second part, 
variables ad estimations in third part and conclusion in forth part are revised. 
 
2. Model 
Relation between NWC and MAS is affected on exchange rate and 
wages. In this game, NWC determines wages at first and then MAS 
determines exchange rate and player's payoff is defined respect to inflation 
and unemployment rate. Exchange rate is defined as price index of non oil 
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products and ULC is cost of to employ each worker. Therefore, we can 
define relation between inflation and factors which affected on it, as 
equation (1); 
 
242321 ])1[(])1[(][   LnOPaLnCPILnWaLnCPILnWaLnNeerLnNOPaLnCPI   
(1) 
 
Equation (1) is rewritten as; 
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In equation (2), variables are;   Current inflation rate, 2  inflation rate 
in two years ago, NOP inflation rate of foreign non oil products. Neerg  
Appreciation tare of inter money respect to foreign money. Wg  Growth rate 
of current wages and 2Wg growth rate of wages with two lags. 2OP
Inflation rate of oil products with to lags,  elasticity of ULC respect to CPI 
and LPg  is expected inflation rate. 
We can rewrite equation (2) as below; 
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In equation (3), we have; U unemployment rate, 3wg third lag of growth 
of wage and 3 third lag of inflation rate, CPFC unemployment insurance. 
Workers are negotiated with principals to determine wages in competitive 
markets and workers want to equal between their income and work hours. 
Therefore, workers want more wages respect to money which received.  
Government knows that more wages is cussed to more inflation and less 
economic growth. Then government should determine wages which equal 
between inflation rate and unemployment. Therefore NWC wants to 
minimize equation (3); 
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In equation (3), 1 , 2 , 3 are negotiation power of workers, government 
and principals.   is government benefits which decline from inflation (


 ) and unemployment ( UU

 ). 

, U

are wanted inflation and 
unemployment rates.  
In equation (3), 0 , 0 , 0  and 


3
1
1
i
i . In this equation, 
first part is cost of to employ workers and second part is government costs. 
When unemployment and inflation are deviated from it's wanted rates. In 
equation (3) third parameter is cost of rise of unemployment and inflation. 
NWC minimize equation (3) respect to wg  and we have optimal growth 
of wages; 
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Therefore; 
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Edward (1980), Kamin (1998), Chei and Winkle (1999) revealed that 
depreciation of inter money respect to foreign money is caused to more 
export and less import. In this condition, if money is dependent to import of 
inputs, it is caused to inflation and more wages. 
MAS defines exchange rate and minimize equation (5); 
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In equation (5), 
Eg is exchange rate growth and   is deviation of 
inflation from it's wanted rate. Therefore, we have a game between MAS and 
NWC. At first, wage ( wg ) is determined by NWC respect to equation (4) 
and MAS minimize equation (5) respect to wg . After NWC, MAS minimize 
equation (5) respect to optimal *wg and we have *Neerg as equation (6); 
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Therefore;  
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Respects to Nash equilibrium, appreciation of inter money reveals 
reaction of MAS respect to optimal growth rate of wage ( *wg ) which, that 
is response of NWC. 
Therefore according to Nash rule, every agents determine their optimal 
instruments to achieve optimal benefits and equilibrium. At the end, Nash 
equilibrium is intersection of MAS and NWC strategies. 
 
3. Variables and Estimation 
In this paper, we use from data of 2000-2014 for Iran and these data are 
collected from international money fund, central bank and amar center
1
. In 
our estimation i
W
ii ENeer )(
10
1 , which iW is weight of Iran trade with ten 
countries which has most trade with Iran in our period
2
 and E is exchange 
rate. Variables in our model are; 
CPI: Consumer price index 
 
1 We do not have data of 2015 
2 Imaret Arabia, Germany, France, Italy, China, Korea, England, Russia, Japan, Spain. 
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ULC
f
: Cost of worker (
PL
W
) 
)(
CPI
W
LP  : Productivity of worker 
U: Unemployment rate 
 : Inflation rate 
CPFC: Unemployment insurance 
W: Average wage in industry sector 
f
iULC : Cost of foreign worker. 
NOP: Price index of non oil import goods. 
OP: Price index of oil import goods. 
IP: Estimated exchange rate for non oil goods 
OP  : Inflation rate of oil products 
NOP : Inflation rate of non oil products 
LPg : Growth of worker's productivity 
Wg : Growth rate of wage. 
Neerg : Appreciation of Neer 
As we said above, price index equation is as equation (7); 
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ULC is written as; 
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 Is a parameter in labor productivity function and ULC growth is; 
 
  WULC gg )1(                                                                          (9) 
 
According to Philips curve, we have; 
 
CPFCbgbbgbbU LPW 534310                                          (10) 
 
Estimation results of equation (7), (9) and (10) with OLS
3
 method and 
with Eviews 7, are as below; 
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3 Ordinary Lease Square 
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Respect to equation (12), 285/01 a , 419/02 a , 408/03 a , 
0605/04 a and respect to equation (13), 38/30 b , 174/01 b , 
1092/02 b , 00058/03 b which are used in equations (1) and (2). 
According to equations (5), (6), (12) and (13), we can write; 
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Equilibrium strategy of Nash equilibrium is dependent to (4) and (5) 
equations. But in some conditions we do not arrive to Nash equilibrium, 
these conditions are as below; 
1- If worker's negotiation power increases, wages rise and if principal 
dependent to government's negotiation power, inflation and unemployment 
rates. 
2- If foreign inflation increases, price of import goods rise, we have 
inter inflation and wages increase. If unemployment insurance decreases, 
wages increase too. 
3- If exchange rate increases, or inter money depreciate, import input 
prices are increased and is caused to inter inflation. Therefore arriving to 
Nash equilibrium is very hard and impossible. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we survey a game theory method to survey policy of 
determination wages and exchange rate to stability economics. When 
exchange rate increases, import goods price rise and we have cost push 
inflation, wages are increased and we have unemployment. Therefore wages 
are determined respect to exchange rate changes. As we said, wages are 
determined as a game between MAS and NWC. 
But in real world, some conditions affected on Nash equilibrium and 
wages are determined as non Nash method and government equals between 
benefits of workers and principals. In Iran government has important role in 
determination of wages. 
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